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An old friend from graduate school, who may have had unrealistic expectations about legal practice, 
used to claim that law was an ever-present vocational temptation for philosophers. As he put it, 
“Why argue with smart people for peanuts when you could make a fortune arguing with losers?” 
(He’s now a dean, so you can see where this sort of thinking leads.)  
I should clarify my title. I don’t intend a megalomaniacal memoir of my disputational 
triumphs—although that would at least have the merit of brevity. On the contrary, I want to say 
something about the sort of arguments that it is possible to lose, and whether losing arguments can 
be done well. I shall focus on losing philosophical arguments, and I will be talking about arguments 
in the sense of acts of arguing. This is the sort of act that one can perform on one’s own or with one 
other person in private. But in either of these cases it is difficult to win—or to lose.1 So I shall 
concentrate on arguments with audiences. We may think of winning or losing such arguments in 
terms of whether the audience is convinced. Of course, this doesn’t necessarily have anything to do 
with who is in the right. (I am going to assume that there is a right to be in, that is that philosophical 
debates are factive.) That means that there are two sorts of loser: real losers, who lose the argument 
deservedly, because they are in the wrong, and mere losers, who lose the argument undeservedly, 
because they are in the right.2 Hence there must also be two sorts of winner: real winners, who win 
the argument deservedly, because they are in the right, and mere winners, who win the argument 
undeservedly, because they are in the wrong.3 An optimal outcome for arguments with losers would 
be if all the losers are real losers. In other words, our goal is to minimise the number of mere losers. 
Before I go any further I should address the possibility that there are no losers at all in 
philosophical arguments. If that’s true, it follows that you can’t lose any of your philosophical 
arguments, which is reassuring. Sadly, it also follows that no one you argue with can lose either. This 
seems less satisfactory. But why might we deny the existence of losers in philosophical arguments? 
Especially when there seems to be such abundant evidence for their existence. There are three broad 
classes of objection to the existence of losers in philosophical arguments. We shall see that we can 
learn something from each of these objections, even if we are unconvinced by any of them. That 
this is possible also tells us something about the positive contribution losers make to philosophical 
argument. 
Florida Philosophical Review                  Volume XVI, Issue 1, Winter 2016 2 
 
 
 
The Pessimistic Objection 
 
I shall call the first objection The Pessimistic Objection. This states that There are no losers in 
philosophical arguments because there are no winners. That is, all philosophical arguments are interminable and 
irresoluble. Because they never end, their outcome is never decided. 
The principal problem with this objection is that it is empirically false. Of course there are 
many philosophical disputes of interminable duration, but that is not true of all of them. We do an 
injustice to intellectual history in forgetting the disputes that have been settled, or underestimating 
how hard fought they were. It’s not that the losers never were, it’s that they’ve been airbrushed out 
of the story. They deserve better than that. 
Nor should a lone holdout be sufficient to deny that a dispute is settled.4 Tim Williamson 
rightly observes that “As in natural science, something can be collectively known in a community 
even if it is occasionally denied by eccentric members of that community.”5 Such (near) consensus is 
strong evidence that the holdouts are real losers. 
Losers may readily be found in both the purest and the most applied areas of philosophy. I 
heartily endorse Williamson’s maxim that “we can often produce mathematical models of fragments 
of philosophy and, when we can, we should.”6 A faithful mathematical model can show us that 
some positions are non-starters.7 Hence this process has decisively defeated many hitherto plausible 
positions and made losers out of their advocates. Philosophers may also be found on the wrong side 
of many past social disputes. There were philosophers who argued for prohibition or against female 
suffrage, for example. Surely those guys were real losers. 
A weaker, but perhaps more interesting version of this objection is suggested by Daniel 
Dennett: “I have learned that arguments, no matter how watertight, often fall on deaf ears. I am 
myself the author of arguments that I consider rigorous and unanswerable but that are often not so 
much rebutted or even dismissed as simply ignored.”8 Dennett’s complaint seems to be that he has 
been robbed of his victory by the simple expedient of ignoring him. If only it were that easy! But if 
his arguments really are unanswerable, then his dialectical opponents are real losers, whether they 
acknowledge it or not.9 And if they’re not unanswerable, then someone should hurry up and answer 
him (perhaps proving Dennett to be the real loser). Either way, this seems like a failure of dialectical 
obligation rather than a lack of losers. This leads us to an important insight: unwillingness to engage 
in argument can itself be a losing proposition.  
 
The Optimistic Objection 
 
I call the second objection to the existence of losers in philosophical arguments The Optimistic 
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Objection. This states that There are no losers in philosophical arguments because everyone’s a winner! 
This sort of claim is most frequently made in praise of the virtues of specific philosophers, 
rather than of philosophy as a whole. For example, consider these lines from an obituary: “To lose 
an argument to Peter Lipton nearly always gave pleasure, never a sense of loss or wounding: 
seemingly effortlessly, he made all philosophical discussion become a collaboration in which the 
only winners were reason and truth. There were no losers” (emphasis added).10 This is high praise for a 
justly celebrated philosopher. But, as an argument for the non-existence of losers, even in this 
narrow context, it is unsuccessful: even if the cost of losing a philosophical argument were always 
outweighed by other cognitive gains, the losers would still be losers argumentatively, despite being 
net winners over all. 
Perhaps there could be win-win, non-zero sum philosophical arguments in which all parties 
were in some sense argumentative winners. I am not sure I quite understand what such an argument 
would be like, but I am sure that it is not typical of philosophical arguments. Hence this version of 
the Optimistic Objection also seems to fail.11 
The Optimistic Objection resembles the aphorism attributed to Mahatma Gandhi, that true 
victory is such that the defeated does not hate the victor. It is a valuable insight, despite its 
paradoxical expression. There is something important in the observation that the cost of losing an 
argument can be outweighed by other cognitive gains. Crucially, acrimony and disrespect seem 
certain to diminish the likelihood of realising such gains. 
 
The Misrepresentation Objection 
 
The last and perhaps the most interesting objection I call The Misrepresentation Objection. This 
states that There are no losers in philosophical arguments because ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ misrepresent philosophical 
argumentation. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson long ago observed how conceptual metaphors can work 
to structure our thought.12 They also noted that argument-is-war is one such metaphor. Empirical 
research has shown that war metaphors can be counterproductive in other fields. For example, 
“enemy metaphors in cancer information reduce some prevention intentions without increasing 
others, making their use potentially harmful for public health.”13 Perhaps such metaphors are equally 
pernicious in philosophy. Indeed, several authors have criticized the argument-is-war metaphor at 
length. Daniel Cohen offers a whole range of alternative metaphors for argument: “reciprocal 
reading,” “diplomatic negotiation,” “growth or adaptation,” “metamorphosis,” “cross-pollination,” 
“leading to hybridization,” “brainstorming,” and “barnraising.”14 Many of these alternative 
metaphors are thought-provoking, and offer tempting vistas of philosophical inquiry, but their 
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existence does not really further the Misrepresentation Objection. At best, they show that “winning” 
and “losing” are not (always) the only way to conceptualise philosophy, not that it can’t be so 
conceptualised. 
There is an ongoing argument whether philosophical argumentation is intrinsically 
adversarial. Robert Nozick asks “Why are philosophers intent on forcing others to believe things? Is 
that a nice way to behave toward someone?”15 He continues by advocating an explanatory model: 
“the original motivation for studying or entering philosophy … is puzzlement, curiosity, a desire to 
understand, not a desire to produce uniformity of belief. Most people do not want to become 
thought-police. The philosophical goal of explanation rather than proof not only is morally better, it 
is more in accord with one’s philosophical motivation.”16 Likewise Dennett proposes a narrative 
alternative to argument “I have to use more artful methods. I have to tell a story. You don’t want to 
be swayed by a story? Well, I know you won’t be swayed by a formal argument; you won’t even listen 
to a formal argument for my conclusion, so I start where I have to start.”17 Other philosophers have 
advocated other alternatives to argument, such as close reading.18 Ironically enough, the critics of 
adversariality have made a strong case. (This is ironic, but not inconsistent: they are arguing that 
philosophy should not be conducted through arguments, not that it cannot be. This is, as it were, the 
argument to end all arguments: if they win, there will be no more arguing.) But no one disputes that 
philosophy has been conducted adversarially, whether or not it might (sometimes or always) be 
better conducted some other way. And with adversariality come losers. 
 
Vicious Adversariality 
 
So it seems that we are stuck with the losers. What can we do to make the best of them? That is, 
how do we avoid creating mere losers and how do we make life no more uncomfortable than 
necessary for real losers? These two questions are closely related—if the cost of being a real loser is 
too great, we incentivise people to try to win at all costs, even when they are in the wrong. And if 
they somehow succeed in winning when they should have lost, theirs is the hollow victory of the 
mere winner, which makes the other party mere losers. 
To see how adversariality can be done well, it may help to look at an example of it being 
done badly. Perhaps the best known example of vicious adversariality in philosophy comes from 
Norman Swartz’s celebrated essay “Philosophy as a Blood Sport.” He recounts an audience member 
at a paper at a 1965 APA meeting responding to the speaker as follows: “You have got it all wrong. I 
am going to tell you what you should have said. Then, when I have said that, I will leave this room 
because I do not care how you will reply.”19 There’s no excuse for this sort of bad behaviour, but it 
is notable that Swartz’s blowhard is at his most obnoxious not when he is at his most adversarial, 
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but when he is at his least adversarial: when he refuses to listen to a reply and leaves the room. This 
is an extreme refusal to discharge his dialectical responsibility: what one may call the Eric Cartman 
move—“Screw you guys, I’m going home.” (Of course, the audience were presumably glad to see 
the back of him—but only because his ghastly personality outweighed his ghastly arguing.) It is also 
what we earlier saw, in a more benign mode, from Dennett. Indeed, a reviewer of the book in which 
the quoted passage occurs refers to it as “an uncharacteristic paroxysm of Nixonian churlishness.”20 
“From time to time,” the reviewer continues, “Dennett seems to give up on the possibility of 
rational discourse with his readership. Sometimes, he preaches to the converted. … Elsewhere, he 
shouts at the unconvertible.”21 This suggests that non-adversariality is itself vicious, as a refusal to 
meet dialectical obligations. Adversariality is not always appropriate, but at least there seem to be 
cases of vicious non-adversariality just as there are cases of vicious adversariality.  
I wish to focus on a specific argument against adversariality, from which I believe we can 
draw a useful message (although perhaps not that intended by its author). Daniel Cohen proposes 
the following analogy to suggest that the best approach to argument is non-adversarial: 
 
The Noble Chess Player: It is the final match of a chess tournament between two 
 intensely competitive grandmasters. One is an older, distinguished player who has devoted 
 his whole life to the game of chess and the pursuit of the championship. He has risen to the 
 highest ranks in the world, but he has fallen just shy of the top on several previous 
 occasions. This may be his last chance. His opponent is much younger, but the defending 
 champion. She is brilliant, even audacious, but sometimes erratic … Now, at a crucial 
 juncture in play, the young champion is about to make a daring but in fact very flawed move. 
 The older player sees, leans forward, and whispers, “Don’t do it.” He pauses, then whispers 
 again, this time through tears in his eyes because he realizes what he is doing “Don’t do it. 
 You have a much stronger move over there. It will be a better game, a more interesting 
 game, a worthy game.”22 
 
The Noble Chess Player may be a fine human being, but he’s a terrible chess player: he’s just 
thrown the game! However, his philosophical counterpart, who makes a similar suggestion to a 
dialectical opponent, is not a terrible arguer. This disanalogy suggests for Cohen that competitive 
sport is a poor model for argument. But there are important differences between the two contexts, 
not least that there is no truth of the matter in a chess game. Hence all losers at chess are real losers 
and all winners real winners. The Noble Chess Player risks forfeiting the game by suggesting the 
better move; his philosophical counterpart would only risk forfeiting the chance of becoming a mere 
winner, a hollow sort of victory.23 Worse, in the philosophical case, mere winning rules out the 
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possibility of real winning. So if the philosopher wants to compete for the true prize, pointing out 
the opponent’s error is tactically astute. 
Dual to the Noble Chess Player, we may consider the equally implausible Ignoble Engineer 
who seeks to win engineering arguments at any cost, regardless of the truth of the case. Swartz 
reports on the conspicuous absence of Ignoble Engineers from the visiting speaker series at the 
General Electric Research Laboratory he witnessed as a student intern: “the discussions were 
invariably, and wholly, given over to trying to enhance, and make use of, one another’s work, to a 
cooperativeness, and selflessness that was natural, easy, and uninhibited. No one tried to “score any 
points” off anybody else; no one tried to attack any other person’s work.”24 That’s not to say that 
the contrast Swartz observes between the APA and General Electric is attributable solely to the 
superior virtue of engineers as compared to philosophers. Perhaps engineers, at least at their own 
seminars, are seldom sufficiently provoked. Imagine that by some farcical mischance an invitation to 
the seminar went astray and the engineers were treated to a discussion of how electrical charge is 
socially constructed or a presentation on the perpetual motion machine the speaker had constructed 
in his garage. Indeed, what makes the Ignoble Engineer implausible is the high likelihood of being 
found out: such a character would be exposed as a real loser pretty quickly. 
So how do we accelerate the nonsense-exposing process in philosophy? Certainly not by 
reducing adversariality—but not by needless acrimony either. 
 
Virtuous Adversariality 
 
The positive part of this programme is where there is most to say, but also where I shall say least. In 
part this is because I think I have gone on long enough. More relevantly, this has been a talk about 
losers, so it would be out of place to say too much about the winners. Nonetheless, although there is 
a great deal of work that remains to be done, some substantial progress has already been made, and I 
wish to close by pointing towards it. 
Ian James Kidd, who has written extensively on virtuous adversariality, summarises the 
problem as that of how to avoid what we may call the Three Bs: “bullying, bias, and bastards.”25 But 
how is that to be done? It might be tempting to lay down a set of detailed rules for the conduct of 
philosophical discourse. Some people have attempted as much. But I think that Nozick is at least 
right in saying that “Most people do not [go into philosophy] to become thought-police.”26 Any 
project of this sort risks blocking innovation in philosophical argument and imposing a heavy 
burden on the well-intentioned, while being essentially unenforceable against the ill-intentioned. 
Instead of such onerous and impractical schemes, I contend that we need to inculcate dispositions 
towards good thinking, that is intellectual virtues. A full catalogue of such virtues would be a 
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substantial undertaking, but we have already seen some of them at work: such as willingness to 
engage in argument and respect for other arguers.27 
 
Conclusion 
 
Without losers there wouldn’t be any winning. Without determined losers, losers who make as 
strong a case as they can for their losing positions, there wouldn’t be any winning worthy of the 
name. It is seldom the case that losers are wrong about everything. Nonetheless, arguments for 
losing propositions often receive scant attention once it is clear that they have lost. It can be worth 
revisiting the losing side of arguments to retrieve these insights, as I hope to have demonstrated in a 
small way this evening. Lastly, unless we lead exceedingly unadventurous or improbably successful 
philosophical careers, we are bound to be losers ourselves often enough. Sheer self-interest should 
lead us to require that they be treated well! 
So, in closing, let’s hear it for the losers!28 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                     
1 Why? Because it can be hard to say whether or not an arguer has met a criterion for winning an 
argument if there are only one or two people present. (And, of course, if I were to lose an argument 
to myself, I would also be the winner!) 
2 I am using desert in a narrow sense, in which an arguer only deserves to lose if objectively wrong. 
By contrast, one might say that an arguer deserves to lose if the current evidence does not favour 
their position, even if in fact they’re right. Perhaps in this sense Aristarchus deserved to lose to 
Ptolemy, since the former had little evidence for heliocentrism. But in the relevant sense, Aristarchus 
was still a (mere) loser, albeit an uncommonly prescient one. 
3 We may also identify Gettier losers, who are in the wrong but lose only because they argue badly 
(or because the audience is incompetent), and Gettier winners, who are in the right but win only 
because their opponents argue badly (or because the audience is incompetent). Gettier winning is 
real winning, since the winner is in the right, but it does not represent evidence that the winner is in 
the right, as real winning otherwise would. 
4 My point here is only that holdouts have no veto on consensus, not that they have no other 
virtues. As John Stuart Mill remarked, “the mere example of nonconformity, the mere refusal to 
bend the knee to custom, is itself a service.” J. S. Mill, On Liberty, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
Volume 18, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 269. 
5 Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 280. 
6 Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, 291.  
7 Williamson cites the philosophy of possibility and necessity and the philosophy of truth as areas 
where technical developments in recent decades have rendered some otherwise attractive positions 
untenable (Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, 280). 
8 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York, NY: Simon 
& Schuster, 1995), 12. 
9 That is, the opponents would be real losers if the audience scores the argument for Dennett, as it 
would seem that they should if the situation is as Dennett describes. If the opponents refuse to 
accept the audience’s verdict, perhaps we might best describe them as sore losers. (However, 
Dennett’s opponents would be mere winners if their silence unaccountably convinced the audience.) 
10 John Forrester, “Professor Peter Lipton: Razor-sharp Cambridge University Philosopher of 
Science,” The Independent (January 8, 2008). Available online at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/ professor-peter-lipton-razor-sharp-cambridge-
university-philosopher-of-science-769140.html.  
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11 One way of developing this objection might be to distinguish two senses of winning (and losing). 
Winning a contest and winning a trophy are different sorts of winning (even if the trophy goes to 
the winner of the contest). Thus Erik Krabbe maintains that, although “only one of the parties can 
win in the victory sense of ‘winning’ . . . both parties may win in the benefit sense” (Erik C. 
W. Krabbe, “Winning and Losing for Arguers,” Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09 [2009]: 11). 
My focus has been exclusively confined to the victory sense of winning (or of losing). I agree with 
Geoff Goddu that this is the sense relevant to adversarial argumentation (Geoff C. Goddu, 
Commentary on Erik C. W. Krabbe’s “Winning and Losing for Arguers,” Argument Cultures: 
Proceedings of OSSA 09 [2009]: 3), which I address directly in the next two sections. 
12 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1980). 
13 David J. Hauser and Norbert Schwarz, “The War on Prevention: Bellicose Cancer Metaphors 
Hurt (Some) Prevention Intentions,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41.1 (2015): 66. 
14 Daniel H. Cohen, “Argument Is War … and War Is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors 
for Argumentation,” Informal Logic 17.2 (1995): 182 ff. 
15 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 5. 
16 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 13. 
17 Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 12. 
18 See Andrea Nye, Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic (London: Routledge, 1990). 
For discussion, see Trudy Govier, The Philosophy of Argument (Newport News, VA: Vale Press, 1999), 
59. See also Phyllis Rooney, “When Philosophical Argumentation Impedes Social and Political 
Progress,” Journal of Social Philosophy 43.3 (2012): 317-333; Catherine Hundleby, “Aggression, 
Politeness, and Abstract Adversaries,” Informal Logic, 33.3 (2013): 238-262. 
19 Norman Swartz, “Philosophy as a Blood Sport,” Simon Fraser University (April 9, 1994). 
Available online at: http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/blood_sport.htm. 
20 Nicholas S. Thompson, “Has Dennett Given Up on Argument? A Review of Daniel C. Dennett’s 
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea,” Behavior and Philosophy 24.2 (1996): 171. 
21 Thompson, “Has Dennet Given Up on Argument?” 171. 
22 Daniel H. Cohen, “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation.” Proceedings of ISSA 2014: 
Eighth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (2015): 258. 
23 Or, if the philosopher was in the right, a Gettier winner. But, although a Gettier win is a real win, 
it does not provide the prima facie evidence that one is in the right that (non-Gettier) real winning 
does. So it would still be a hollow victory. 
24 Swartz, “Philosophy as a Blood Sport.” 
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25 Ian James Kidd, “Epistemic Humility: Virtue, Argumentation, Status, and Bias,” presented to 
EIDOS, Durham University, 2015; see also Ian James Kidd, “Intellectual Humility, Confidence, and 
Argumentation,” Topoi 35.2 (2016): 395-402. 
26 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, 13. 
27 I have discussed some virtues of argument at greater length elsewhere (Andrew Aberdein, “Virtue 
in Argument,” Argumentation 24.2 (2010): 165-179). 
28 I am grateful to many people—none of them losers!—for their comments on an earlier version of 
this paper, including Lilian Bermejo-Luque, Iovan Drehe, José Gascón, James Franklin, Nicholas 
Joll, Ian James Kidd, Moti Mizrahi, Steven Patterson, Alan Rosiene, and Rafał Urbaniak. 
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